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The FDA's Attempt to Scare the Smoke Out
of You: Has the FDA Gone Too Far with
the Nine New Cigarette Warning Labels?
Kristin M. Sempeles*
I.

INTRODUCTION

But I would have thee remember that if thou shoulds't become a nonsmoker, it will be because thou hadst decided for thyself.. . for every
man has a free will to accept or reject tobacco unless it has, by its
very nature, taken such a hold on him as to compel him to make a
choice in its favour.'
The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act ("The
Act") 2 of June 2009 marked the first change to cigarette warning labels
in the United States in over 25 years.3 The Act, for the first time, gave
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) authority to regulate tobacco
products.
In June 2011, under The Act, the FDA introduced the
("The
Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements
6
Rule"), 5 which imposed new regulations on cigarettes.
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1. ESTHER WANNING, MEDITATIONS FOR SURVIVING WITHOUT CIGARETTES 7 (1994)
(citing A.A. WfLLIAMS, A SMOKER'S PILGRIM'S PROGRESS (1922) (emphasis added).
2. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Act ("The Act"), Pub. L. No. 111-31,
123 Stat. 1776 (2009) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2006 & Supp. 2009)).
3. In 2009, President Obama signed into law the Family Smoking Prevention and
Tobacco Control Act, which gave the FDA exclusive jurisdiction to regulate tobacco,
while specifically prohibiting the FDA from banning tobacco sales. Id. The Act marked
the first change in cigarette labels since 1984 when the Comprehensive Smoking
Education Act established four warning labels, which were to be rotated on cigarette
packages and advertisements. Comprehensive Smoking Education Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1331-40 (1994).
4. See Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 201(a) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1333(d)).
5. FDA, Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements ("The
Rule"), 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628-36,629 (June 22, 2011).

6. See id.
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Under The Rule, one of nine new graphic warning labels is required
to appear on all cigarette packages and advertisements by September
2012.7 The Rule requires the warning labels to include colored images
such as a plume of cigarette smoke enveloping an infant who is receiving
a kiss from her mother; a healthy lung adjacent to a diseased lung; an
image of the inside of a mouth afflicted with cancerous lesions; a barechested male cadaver lying in the morgue; and a woman weeping
uncontrollably. 8 In addition to the graphic warnings, The Rule mandates
that all cigarette packages display both a direct exhortation to smokers to
quit 9 and one of the nine specified textual warnings required by The
Act.10 The warnings include "Cigarettes cause cancer," "Smoking during
pregnancy can harm your baby," and "Smoking can kill you."" Under
The Act, the warning labels must be prominently displayed on the top 50
percent of the front and back panels of all cigarette packages and
advertisements.12 Unlike previous warning labels, which conveyed
purely factual information, the new warning labels cross over the line of
informative warnings into anti-smoking advocacy. 13 While The Act
dictates many of the requirements for The Rule and provides the FDA
with the power to regulate cigarettes, The Rule proposed by the FDA
goes beyond its regulatory authority14and imposes additional restrictions
on the speech of tobacco companies.
In August 2011, five of the largest cigarette companies sued the
FDA in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in
response to The Rule's graphic label requirements.1 5 The tobacco
companies alleged that The Rule violated their free speech protected
under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. 6 The
7. See 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,628-29.
8. Id. at 36,696 (stating that graphics were selected to show depictions of the
effects of sickness and disease caused by smoking).
9. See id.(requiring each package to prominently display "I-800-QUIT-NOW," a
telephone number the FDA dedicated to provide cessation assistance).
10. See Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 201 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1333).
11. See id.
12. Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 201 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)) ("Each label
statement required by paragraph (1) shall be located in the upper portion of the front and
rear panels of the package, directly on the package underneath the cellophane or other
clear wrapping. Each label statement shall comprise the top 50 percent of the front and
rear panels of the package. The word 'WARNING' shall appear in capital letters and all
text shall be in conspicuous and legible 17-point type.").
13. See discussion infra Section IV.
14. Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 201 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1333(d)) (providing
requirements for the warning labels in order to "promote a greater public understanding
of the risk associated with the use of tobacco products").
15. See Complaint, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company Co. v. FDA, No.
1:1 1CV01482 (D.D.C. 2011), availableat http://bit.ly/qpvly5.
16. See id. at *2.

2012]

THE FDA's ATTEMPT TO SCARE THE SMOKE OUT OF

You

225

FDA insisted that its alleged substantial government interest-to inform
the public about the risk of smoking-outweighed the infringement on
the tobacco companies' constitutional free speech rights.17 The FDA
commissioner reasoned that the government "want[s] to make a
difference and help people who are smoking stop smoking and
discourage people who haven't taken up the habit yet."' 18 On November
7, 2011, the district court granted a temporary injunction enjoining the
FDA from enforcing any of the new requirements contained in The Rule
until 15 months after a final ruling of the district court.' 9 Following the
temporary injunction, on February 29, 2012, the district court granted the
tobacco companies' summary judgment motion effectively halting The
The district court found The Rule
Rule from enactment.2 °
unconstitutional because it violated the tobacco companies' First
Amendment rights by compelling speech.2'
The government has since appealed the district court's ruling to the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.22 The
circuit court heard oral argument on April 10, 2012.23 A ruling is
expected in late 2012; however, any decision is expected to be
appealed.24 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has
also recently ruled on this topic, but the Sixth Circuit's ruling is at odds
with the DC district court ruling.25 However, the Sixth Circuit addressed
The Rule's requirements about the size and placement of the new
warning labels and not the nine new graphic warnings.26 With the

17.

See Press Briefing, Kathleen Sebelius, Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., and

Margaret Hamburg, FDA Comm'r (June 21, 2011), available at http:/fbit.ly/FDA-press-

briefing [hereinafter Press Briefing].
18. Id.
19. Order Granting Preliminary Injunction, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, No.
1:11CV01482 (D.D.C.2011).

20.

Order Granting Summary Judgment, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 2012

WL 653828 (D.D.C. Feb. 29, 2012).

21.

Id.

22.
23.
24.

R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, No. 11-5332 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
Id.
See discussion inf,,a note 26.

25. In March 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit largely
upheld the government's authority to regulate tobacco products, including requirements
calling for stronger graphic warnings on cigarettes. See Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery,
Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012). The Sixth Circuit ruling involved the
overall tobacco law, including the labels, whereas the D.C. Circuit case focuses on the
labels as the FDA currently proposes them. Id. One of the three judges in the Sixth
Circuit case issued a dissenting opinion on the graphic portion of the labels, writing that
requiring a product manufacturer to place a large-scale color graphic on a productwarning label is simply unprecedented. Id.
26.

See id.
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divergent rulings in the lower courts, it is highly likely that the United
States Supreme Court will make the ultimate decision.2 7
When granting the tobacco companies' summary judgment motion,
the district court applied a strict scrutiny evaluation. 28 Under strict
scrutiny analysis, the government carries the burden of demonstrating
that The Rule is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government
interest. 29 Commercial speech, however, is not always afforded a strict
In evaluating
scrutiny analysis under the First Amendment.3 °
commercial speech, intermediate scrutiny is often applied. 31 The
Supreme Court held that, when the speech being compelled does not
consist of purely factual and uncontroversial information, strict scrutiny
applies.32 A court must therefore first decide whether the compelled
speech is purely factual in order to determine the level of scrutiny to be
applied.33
To further explore whether The Rule is constitutional or whether the
courts should permanently enjoin the FDA from enforcing The Rule, this
Comment will first outline the history of the FDA and relevant tobacco
regulations in Section 11. 34 Specifically, Subsection II.A will discuss the
history of the FDA's regulatory authority on tobacco products, and, in
addition, will provide an overview of relevant legislative acts that have
been enacted to regulate tobacco products.35 Subsection II.B will
analyze

The

Act,36 the

federal

government's

most

recent

and

controversial legislative act designed to impose new regulations on
tobacco products.37 In addition, Subsection II.C will examine The Rule38

27. Id.
28. Order Granting Summary Judgment, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 2012
WL 653828, *6 (D.D.C. Feb. 29, 2012).
29. Id.
30. See Tamara R. Piety, Against Freedom of CommercialExpression, 29 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2583, 2592 (2008).
31. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
32. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel for Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S.
626, 651 (1985) (quoting In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 201 (2002)).
33. See Wooley v. Marnard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1997) (explaining that the First
Amendment prohibits the government from compelling corporations to "use their private
property as a 'mobile billboard' for State's ideological message").
34. See discussion infra Section II.
35. See discussion infra Section II.A.
36. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Act ("The Act"), Pub. L. No. 111-31,
123 Stat. 1776 (2009).
37. See discussion infra Section 11.B.
38. FDA, Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements ("The
Rule"), 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628 (June 22, 2011).
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enacted by the FDA requiring tobacco companies to adhere nine new
graphic warning labels to all cigarette packaging and advertisements.3 9
Section III of this Comment will examine the development of the
commercial freedom of speech doctrine4 ° under the First Amendment.4 1
Specifically, Subsection III.A will discuss the landmark case on
commercial freedom of speech, Central Hudson Gas and Electric
Corporationv. Public Service Commission of New York.42 This Supreme
Court case provided a four-part test for determining the constitutionality
of free speech, which will also be analyzed further.43 This analysis is
followed by Subsection III.B, which examines Lorillard Tobacco
Corporation v. Reilly,44 one45 of the Supreme Court's most recent
commercial free speech cases.

Section IV will analyze whether The Rule is constitutional.46 First,
the analysis will assess The Rule under the Central Hudson four-part
test 47 to determine if it violates the tobacco companies' First Amendment
rights.48 Next, the analysis will focus on whether the FDA is
new restrictions 49 it
overstepping its regulatory authority with the
50
Rule.
The
under
companies
imposes on tobacco
Section V of this Comment will address alternatives that the FDA
can use to inform consumers about the adverse health effects of
cigarettes without violating tobacco companies' First Amendment
rights. 51 This Comment will conclude with Part VI, which summarizes
why The Rule will likely be found unconstitutional, the direction the
government should take to benefit public health and safety, and why it is
in the best interest of the public for the Supreme Court to grant a
permanent injunction on the FDA's Rule.

39. See discussion infra Section I.C.
40. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
41. See discussion infra Section III.
42. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980);
see discussion infra Section III.A.
43. See id.
44. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
45. See discussion infra Section III.B.
46. See discussion infra Section IV.
47. See U.S. CONST. amend. 1.

48.
49.
Rule"),
50.

See discussion infra Section IV.A.
See FDA, Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements ("The
76 Fed. Reg. 36,628 (June 22, 2011).
See discussion infra Section IV.B.

51.

See discussion infra Section V.

52.

See discussion infra Section IV.
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II. BACKGROUND

While recent attempts to regulate tobacco products have been highly
publicized, these recent attempts are not the federal government's first
regulations or first attempts to tighten regulations imposed on tobacco
products. 3 However, the recent attempt marks the first time that the
FDA has successfully gained regulatory authority over tobacco products,
marking a significant benchmark in how aggressive a role the United
States government wants to take in cigarette regulation. 4 To understand
the scope of The Rule, this section will include a brief legislative history
of tobacco products. 5 This history will be followed by an examination
of The Act's requirements, the regulatory authority The Act granted the
FDA, and the nine new warning labels The Rule established under The
Act.56 This section will conclude with the current status of The Rule.57
A.

The History of Tobacco Regulations and the FDA's Expanding
Regulatory Authority

In 1938, the FDA made its first attempt to gain regulatory authority
over cigarettes when Congress enacted the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA),58 which defined the scope of the FDA's
jurisdiction over food, drugs, cosmetics, and devices.59 The FDA
lobbied, albeit unsuccessfully, for Congress to include tobacco in the
FDCA's definition of "drugs. 60 Ultimately, the FDCA rejected the

53. Compare Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Act ("The Act"), Pub. L. No.
111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009) (providing the FDA with the authority to regulate tobacco
products), and The Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628 (establishing nine new cigarette warning
labels), with Comprehensive Smoking Education Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (1994)
(establishing four warning labels, which were to be rotated on cigarette packages and
advertisements). See also FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120,
137-39 (2000) (stating that Congress has directly addressed the problem through
legislation on six occasions since 1965).
54. See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, §
201, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 15
U.S.C., and 21 U.S.C.); see also Press Briefing, supra note 17.
55. See discussion infra Section II.A.
56. See discussion infra Section II. B.
57. See discussion infra Section II.C; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2006).
58. Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938)
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-99 (2006)).
59. 21 U.S.C. § 321 (2006) (establishing regulative authority boundaries for the
FDA by clearly identifying the FDA's control to include only food, drugs, cosmetics, and
devices, not tobacco products).
60. See 21 U.S.C. § 321 (2006); see also Jennifer Costello, Comment, The FDA's
Struggle to Regulate Tobacco, 49 ADMiN. L. REV. 671, 673-79 (1997) (describing
Congress's exclusion of the FDA in the development of tobacco regulation).
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FDA's claim that tobacco products were "drugs," explicitly denying the
FDA's attempt to expand its authority to include tobacco products.61
After the FDA's failed attempt to gain regulatory authority over
tobacco products, the federal government refrained from taking on the
tobacco industry again until 1965.62 In 1965, the federal government
began its campaign to educate the public about cigarettes with the
enactment of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
(FCLAA).6 3 With the enactment of the FCLAA, Congress bestowed
upon the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) the authority to regulate
cigarette labels while simultaneously giving the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) the authority to regulate tobacco advertising on radio
and television.64 In addition to the FTC and FCC, Congress provided
regulatory authority over tobacco products to other government agencies
such as the Internal Revenue Services (IRS), the Department of
Agriculture (USDA), and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and
Explosives (ATF).65
The FCLAA required tobacco companies to display warning labels
with the following textual warning, "Caution: Cigarette Smoking May
Be Hazardous to Your Health," on all cigarette advertisements, packs,
and cartons.66 The black and white textual warning was enclosed in a
black outlined box displayed on the side panel of every cigarette
package.67 According to the Senate report, Congress passed the bill with
the belief "that the individual must be safeguarded in his freedom of
choice-that he has the right to choose to smoke or not to smoke-[but
also] that the individual has the right to know that smoking may be
hazardous to his health. 6 8
Congress tightened the regulation in 1970, with the Public Health
Cigarette Smoking Act (PHCSA),6 9 which amended the FCLAA to

61.

Id.

62. See Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat.
282 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (1970)).
63. See id.
64. See Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1331-40 (1970)); see also Costello, supra note 60, at 677 n.32 (describing the FCC's

initial regulatory role, which required smoking cessation advertising in conjunction with
smoking advertising).
65. See Costello, supra note 60, at 678 n.42 (explaining the IRS's role in taxing
tobacco sales, the Department of Agriculture's regulation of tobacco farming, and the
ATF's task of fighting illegal tobacco sales and distribution).
66. Pub. L. No. 89-92 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970)).
67. See id.
68.

See S. REP. No. 195, at 4 (1965).

69. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87
(1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (2006)).
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include additional requirements on cigarette warning labels. 70 The
PHCSA required the warning labels to include the amended text,
"WARNING: The Surgeon General Has Determined that Cigarette
Smoking is Dangerous to Your Health., 71 In addition, the PHCSA
placed an electronic ban on cigarette advertisements prohibiting cigarette
advertisements from broadcast on the radio or on television.72 Despite
the increased regulation over cigarette packaging and advertising, as well
as the Surgeon General's official declaration that cigarette smoking was
harmful, Congress still refused to grant the FDA regulatory authority
over cigarettes.7 3
The next significant change in tobacco regulations occurred in 1984
when Congress again rejected the option to grant the FDA the authority
to regulate tobacco products.74 Instead, Congress created further
advertising regulation by enacting the Comprehensive Smoking
Education Act (CSEA).7 5 The CSEA was intended to address concern
over the need to educate the public about potential health risks caused by
smoking.76 To accomplish its intent, the CSEA made additional
amendments to the cigarette warning labels requiring one of four new
textual warnings to be placed on all cigarette packages. 77 The CSEA
required the warning labels to include one the following four textual
warnings: (1) "Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Heart Disease and May
Complicate Pregnancy"; (2) "Quitting Smoking Now Greatly Reduces
Serious Risk to Your Health"; (3) "Smoking By Pregnant Women May
Result in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, and Low Birth Weight"; and
(4) "Cigarette Smoke Contains Carbon Monoxide. 78 The CSEA's four
warning labels have been fixtures on all tobacco products since the
CSEA was enacted nearly 30 years ago. 79
While the government seemed content with the required warning
labels, the FDA continued its attempts to gain regulatory authority over
70. See id.
71. See id. § 1333.
72. See id
73. See, e.g., H.R. 11280, 84th Cong. (1956), and S. 2554, 85th Cong. (1957), and
H.R.592, 85th Cong. (1957) (showing Congress' refusal to grant the FDA the regulative
authority over tobacco products by failing to pass bills with provisions that would allow
for the FDA to expand its authority).
74. Comprehensive Smoking Education Act, Pub. L. No. 98-474, 98 Stat. 2200
(1984) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (1994)).
75. See id.
76. Id.
77. Id. § 1333(a)(1).
78. Id.
79. See generally Ronald M. Davis et al., Note, The Rotation of Health Warnings in
Cigarette Advertisements: Compliance with the Comprehensive Smoking Education Act
of 1984, 9 J. PUB. HEALTH POL'Y 403 (1988).
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tobacco products. Specifically, in 1996, the FDA unsuccessfully made
another attempt to gain regulatory authority over cigarettes through the
FDCA. 80 As previously stated, the FDCA prohibits any misbranded
food, drugs,

or devices from

entering into interstate

commerce.

81

Pursuant to this broad regulatory power, the FDA attempted to claim that
cigarettes were a "misbranded drug," and therefore, should be within the
FDA's regulatory authority.82 The issue reached the U.S. Supreme Court
83
in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation, where the Court
ruled in favor of the tobacco companies and denied the expansion of the
FDA's authority. 84 The Court cited Congress' repeated actions to ensure
the legality of cigarettes as justification for rejecting the FDA's argument
that it possessed the jurisdictional power to regulate, or even ban,

cigarettes.
Indicative in the history of the regulation of tobacco products is
both Congress's, and the Court's, desire to prevent the FDA from
regulating tobacco. 86 The legislative history also indicates that the
government's main goal at the time of enactment was to inform
consumers about the potential health related risks linked to smoking so
that they may make informed decisions, but to do so in a manner that
neither infringes on the consumers freedom of choice nor on the tobacco
companies freedom of speech.87

80. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
81. See Regulations Restricting the Sale & Distribution of Cigarettes & Smokeless
Tobacco to Protect Children & Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,615-18 (Aug. 28,
1996).
82. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(h)(2)-(3) (2006) (defining a "device" as having an
"intended" effect on the structure or function of the body or an "intended" use in the cure
or prevention of disease); see also Costello, supra note 60, at 681-83 (discussing the
FDA's struggle to establish jurisdiction through indirect evidence of intent); United
States v. 354 Bulk Cartons Trim Reducing-Aid Cigarettes, 178 F. Supp. 847, 851 (D.N.J.
1959) (holding that cigarette labels showed the manufacturer's intent to affect the
structure or function of a user's body).
83. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
84. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 132-33 (applying the twoprong statutory interpretation test set forth by the Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)); see also Costello, supra note
60, at 677 & n.32 (describing Congress's exclusion of the FDA in the development of
tobacco regulation).
85. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 137 ("Congress has
directly addressed the problem of tobacco and health through legislation on six occasions
since 1965.").
86. See Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 479, 491 (1996) ("[1]f Congress intended such a
result, its failure even to hint at is spectacularly odd.").
87. See S. REP. No. 195, at 4 (1965).
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Family Smoking Preventionand Tobacco ControlAct

In 2009, President Barack Obama signed into law the Family
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act ("The Act"), 8 marking
89
the first change to United States cigarette regulation in over 25 years.
The stated purpose of The Act was to discourage young people from
starting to smoke, as well as to encourage adult smokers to quit by
informing them of the possible harmful effects of smoking. 90 In contrast
to all prior legislation, The Act extends the FDA's regulatory authority to
include tobacco products. 9' The Act provides:
Not later than 24 months after June 22, 2009, the Secretary shall issue
regulations that require color graphics depicting the negative health
consequences of smoking to accompany the label statements
specified in subsection (a)(1). The Secretary may adjust the type
size, text and format of the label statements specified in subsections
(a)(2) and (b)(2) as the Secretary determines appropriate so that both
the graphics and the accompanying label statements are clear,
92
conspicuous, legible and appear within the specified area ....
One of the only provisions in The Act that is consistent with prior
legislation is the provision limiting the FDA's power by disallowing a
complete ban on tobacco sales and the elimination of nicotine from
cigarettes.

93

The most significant changes made by The Act were in the
94
provisions dictating the new cigarette warning label requirements.
First, The Act requires all cigarette packages to include one of the
following new textual warnings:
(1) "Cigarettes are addictive";
(2) "Tobacco smoke can harm your children"; (3) "Cigarettes cause fatal
lung disease"; (4) "Cigarettes cause cancer;" (5) "Cigarettes cause
strokes and heart disease"; (6) "Smoking during pregnancy can harm
your baby"; (7) "Smoking can kill you"; (8) "Tobacco smoke causes
fatal lung disease in nonsmokers"; or (9) "Quitting smoking now greatly
88. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Act ("The Act"), Pub. L. No. 111-31,
123 Stat. 1776 (2009).
89. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't Health & Human Servs., FDA Unveils Final
Cigarette Warning Labels (June 21, 2011), available at http://bit.ly/FDA-unveils-finallabels.
90. See Regulating Tobacco: Q&A with Lawrence Deyton, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 2
(Sep. 28, 2009), http://bit.ly/FDA-QA-Deyton (discussing with the Director of the Center
for Tobacco Products the FDA's plan to regulate tobacco products in a way that protects
the vulnerable youth population from undue influence by tobacco advertising).
91. See Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 201 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1333).
92. See id
93. Id.
94. Id.
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reduces serious risks in your health. 95 In addition, The Act specified
that the labels "shall comprise the top 50 percent of the front and rear
panels of the package" and that the word "WARNING" should appear in
capital letters in 17-point font. 96 The most significant deviation from
previous cigarette regulations is The Act's requirement that "color
graphics depicting the negative health consequences of smoking" must
accompany the textual warnings. 97 The expansion of the FDA's
regulatory authority to include tobacco products under The Act paved the
way for the FDA to attempt the most monumental change in the history
of cigarette regulations.
C.

The FDA's Nine New Cigarette Warning Labels

In response to The Act, in June 2011, the FDA announced the
Required Warning for Cigarettes Packages and Advertisements ("The
Rule"). 98 The Rule includes nine new cigarette-warning labels, which
include both new graphic and textual warnings. Prior to the injunction
discussed above, these warnings were required to appear on all cigarette
packages and advertising by September 2012.99 The FDA claims that
The Rule will increase awareness of specific health risks associated with
smoking, encourage smokers to quit, and empower young people to say
"no" to tobacco. 10 0 The Rule marks a monumental change in the
regulation of the sale of goods; never before in the United States have
producers of lawful products been required to use their own packaging to
convey an emotionally-charged government message urging adult
consumers to shun their products. 1
The emotional-charge of the government's new regulations seems
to stem from the graphics that are now required to be placed on all
tobacco products. The graphics required under The Rule include: color
images of close-ups of cancerous mouth sores; a man smoking through a
tracheotomy; a mother blowing smoke at her baby; a man on life support;
and a corpse lying on an autopsy table. 102 In addition to the graphics and
textual warnings, the labels are also required to contain a direct

95.
96.
97.
98.
Rule"),
99.

Id.
See Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 201 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1333).
Id.
FDA, Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements ("The
76 Fed. Reg. 36,628 (June 22, 2011).
See id.
100. See id. at 36,638; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep't Health & Human Servs.,
FDA Unveils Final Cigarette Warning Labels (June 21, 2010), available at
http://bit.ly/FDA-unveils-final-labels.
101. See 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,639.
102. See id.
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exhortation to smokers to quit smoking, with the placement
of "1-80003
Quit-Now" prominently displayed on all packages. 1
In response to these new labels, five large cigarette manufacturers
have sued the FDA, challenging the constitutionality of the new warning
labels. 10 4 The tobacco companies' state in their complaint that, for more
than 45 years, the government has required various Surgeon General
Warnings to be affixed to all cigarette packages sold in the United States,
yet never before have the tobacco companies challenged the legality of
any of the previous warning labels. 0 5 However, these companies claim
that the FDA has gone too far with its new graphic images requirement
by seeking to make consumers "depressed, discouraged, and afraid" to
buy cigarettes. 10 6 The tobacco companies allege that the vulgar graphic
images and direct exhortation to smokers to "Quit-Now"' 0 7 go beyond
what any other warnings previously required. No longer is the
government requiring tobacco manufacturers to include uncontroversial
factual information on their products to allow consumers to make
educated decisions as to whether to buy their product; instead, the
tobacco companies argue that the government is now unlawfully
compelling manufacturers to affix government anti-smoking advocacy
messages on their cigarette packages.
In support of their position, the tobacco companies quote FDA
Commissioner Margaret Hamburg; 10 8 Hamburg stated that the purpose of
the warnings is to ensure that "every single pack of cigarettes in our
country will in effect become a mini-billboard" for the Government's
anti-smoking message.' 0 9 The tobacco manufacturers further argue that
such compelled messages requiring the companies to advocate against
the purchase of their own lawful product is precisely the type of thing
that the First Amendment is designed to prevent." 0 Furthermore, the

103. See id. at 36,753-55.
104. See Complaint, supra note 15, at *38 (stating that the warnings required no later
than September 22, 2012, would force cigarette makers to "engage in anti-smoking
advocacy" on the government's behalf).
105. See Complaint, supra note 15, at *2.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See Complaint, supra note 15, at *2.
109. FDA, Tobacco Control Announcement (Nov. 10, 2010), http://l.usa.gov/div
W20; see also Press Briefing, supra note 17.
110. See Complaint, supra note 15, at *35; see also Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S.
705, 715 (1997) (ruling that the First Amendment prohibits the Government from
compelling corporations to "use their private property as a 'mobile billboard' for the
State's ideological message"); Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 2011 WL 247296 at * 17 (June
23, 2011) (holding that "[t]he State can express [its] view through its own speech. But a
State's failure to persuade does not allow it to hamstring the opposition. The state may
not burden the speech of others in order to tilt public debate in a preferred direction").
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complaint states that the new warnings do not provide the consumers
with any new information, nor will they have any material impact on
smoking prevalence.' 11
III.

COMMERCIAL FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
IMPLEMENTED THROUGH THE FIRST AMENDMENT

To better understand the constitutional analysis that The Rule must
withstand, this Section will first discuss the commercial freedom of
speech doctrine. Specifically, Subsection III.A of this Comment will
discuss Central Hudson Gas and Electric Company v. Public Service
Commission, 112 the landmark case establishing both the doctrine of
commercial free speech and the four-part test to determine if government
regulation violates commercial free speech. 1 3 Next, subsection III.B
will discuss the Court's most recent freedom of commercial speech case,
Lorillard Tobacco Company v. Reilly,' 14 discussing the Court's use of
Central Hudson's four-part test to determine if the government's tobacco
regulation was constitutional.' 15
As illustrated in the R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company Complaint,
one argument against The Rule is that it is an infringement on the
tobacco companies' constitutional rights." 6
Free speech is a
fundamental right embodied in the First Amendment, 1 7 and many
consider it as the cornerstone of our democratic society." 8 The First
Amendment protects "both the right to speak freely and the right to
refrainfrom speaking at all."" 9 The tobacco companies' right to refrain
from speaking is what is in jeopardy with the enactment of The Rule.
For corporations and individuals, the choice to speak includes "within it
the choice of what not to say."' 20 It is for this reason that, when a statute
compels speech from one who would not otherwise make such speech,
the Court holds this type of compelled speech as "presumptively
unconstitutional."' 2'
However, within the constructs of compelled
commercial speech, narrow exceptions apply.

111.
112.
113.
114.

See Complaint, supra note 15, at *35.
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
See id.at 566; see also discussion infra Section III.A.
See discussion infra Section II.B; see also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533

U.S. 525 (2001).
115. Seeid. at575.
116. See Complaint, supra note 15, at *2.
117. See U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
118. See generally 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 500 (1996).
119.

Wooley v. Maynar, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1997) (emphasis added).

120. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Cal. 475 U.S. 1, 16 (1986).
121. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 839 (1995);
Entertainment Software Ass'n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 651 (7th Cir. 2006).
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For instance, the government may be allowed to compel certain
commercial speech in order to protect consumers from "confusion or
deception. '' 122 When challenged, courts may apply a lesser, intermediate
level of scrutiny to this narrow category of compelled speech if the
is "purely factual and uncontroversial
required disclosure
information." 123 Even under an intermediate scrutiny analysis, purely
factual and uncontroversial information may violate the First
Amendment if the compelled speech is "unjustified or unduly
' 124
burdensome."
The evidence of anti-smoking advocacy, emotional assault on
consumers, and lack of efficacy suggest that The Rule's graphic image
requirements will not be considered the type of purely factual and
uncontroversial information that would allow for intermediate scrutiny
analysis. While it is likely that the court will apply a strict scrutiny
analysis, there is controversy as to which level of scrutiny should apply.
Therefore, this Comment will analyze whether an application of the
lesser intermediate scrutiny test would invalidate The Rule. If The Rule
fails intermediate scrutiny analysis, then it also fails under strict scrutiny
analysis. In sum, this section will provide a detailed framework for
determining when a government-imposed regulation violates commercial
free speech under the First Amendment.
A.

The Development of the Commercial Free SpeechDoctrineand
Central Hudson's Four PartTest

In Central Hudson, the Supreme Court applied intermediate
scrutiny analysis to commercial free speech for the first time. 25 It was
one of the most significant cases in the history of the commercial free
27 theyears
regarding
commerciala
speech
doctrine.' 26 After
implemented
Courtofinuncertainty
Central Hudson
speech jurisprudence,

122. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel for Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626,
651 (1985) (quoting In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 201 (2002)).
123. See id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See id.
127. Compare Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (holding that the
First Amendment protects informational and political speech, not commercial
advertising), overruled by Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc. 425 U.S. 748 (1976), and Breard v. Alexandria 341 U.S. 622, 642 (1951) (finding a
regulation prohibiting door-to-door solicitation constitutional despite the "fact that
periodicals are sold does not put them beyond the protection of the First Amendment"),
abrogatedby Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980),
with Bigelow v. Va., 421 U.S. 809, 825-26 (1975) (deeming Virginia's statue
unconstitutional where it restricted pharmacists' advertisements of prescription drug
prices because a state may not "completely suppress the dissemination of concededly
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four-part test to determine if a government regulation infringed on a
company's constitutional freedom of speech rights.1 28 The first part of
the Central Hudson four-part test is to determine whether the First
Amendment protects the expression; second, it must be determined
whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If the first two
prongs are answered in the affirmative, the third determination to be
addressed is whether the regulation directly advances the governmental
interest asserted. Fourth, a court must determine whether the regulation
129
is more extensive than necessary to advance the government's interest.
The Central Hudson Court stated that, if a regulation fails any one of the
four prongs, the regulation is unconstitutional.
In CentralHudson, the Court applied its newly articulated four-part
test and found New York's regulation, which banned all promotional
advertising by electric utility companies, unconstitutional. 130 The New
York Public Service Commission implemented the ban in the wake of a
winter energy shortage; however, the ban remained in effect after the
shortage had ended.' 3' The Court applied the four-part test to the facts of
the case and concluded that the first two prongs of the test were
satisfied. 32 The Court found that the promotional advertising was lawful
and not misleading 33 and that regulations promoting energy conservation
represented a substantial government
interest in conserving energy and
34
1
rates.
equitable
maintaining
Because the first two prongs were met, the Court turned to the test's
third prong. 35 The Court agreed with the government's argument that
36
the advertisements were directly related to the increase in demand.
Therefore, the ban on such advertisements from utility companies
37
directly advanced the government's interest in energy conservation.
truthful information about entirely lawful activity, fearful of that information's effect
upon its disseminators and its recipients").
128.

See CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 566.

129.
130.
131.

See id. at 566.
See id. at 557.
Id.at 558-59.

132.

Id.

133. See id. at 559 (rejecting the reasoning of the New York Court of Appeals that
advertising by a monopoly cannot improve decision making by consumers and, thus, is
not worthy of First Amendment protection).
134. See id.at 559 (upholding a complex economic argument advanced by the
Commission, which argued that promotional advertising would more likely lead to
inequitable energy rates and distribution among consumers).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See id. at 569 ("There is an immediate connection between advertising and
demand for electricity. Central Hudson would not contest the advertising ban unless it
believed that promotion would increase its sales. Thus, we find a direct link between the
state interest in conservation and the Commission's order.").
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Finally, the Court addressed the fourth prong of the test, analyzing
whether the means used to further the Commission's substantial interest
in energy conservation were more extensive than necessary. 138 It was
here that the Court found that the Commission failed to satisfy its
burden. 139 The Court held that use of the ban on all advertisements was
both unjustifiable and overly broad. 140 Specifically, the Commission was
unable to show that a more limited restriction would not serve its interest
in energy conservation.14 ' The holding in Central Hudson established
the intermediate scrutiny standard that is applied today when determining
if commercial freedom of speech has been violated. 142 In Section IV, this
Comment will apply the test set forth in Central Hudson to the FDA's
Rule. 143
B.

Recent CommercialFree Speech Jurisprudence

One of the Court's most recent decisions on commercial speech is
Lorillard144
In Lorillard, the Massachusetts Attorney General
implemented regulations that attempted to restrict "outdoor advertising,
point-of-sale advertising, retail sales transactions, transactions by mail,
promotions, sampling of products, and labels for cigars. '145 The Court
found that that the regulations were preempted because "Congress
prohibited state cigarette advertising regulations that were motivated by
concerns about smoking and health.' 46 Despite finding that the
regulations were preempted, the Court applied the CentralHudson fourpart test to decide whether the regulations violated the tobacco
47
companies' First Amendments rights.
Again, the Court found that the first and second prongs were easily
met and, thus, the issue remained as to whether the third and fourth
prongs were satisfied. 148 The Court looked at whether the outdoor
advertising and point-of-sale restrictions imposed by the regulations on
all smokeless tobacco and cigar advertisements directly advanced the

138. See id. at 570.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See id. at 569-70.
142. Id.
143. See discussion infra Section IV.
144. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, (2001).
145. Id. at 534.
146. Id. at 548.
147. See id at 554-55 ("We see no need to break new ground ... Central Hudson, as
applied in our more recent cases, provides an adequate basis for decision.").
148. See id. at 555 (noting that, in regards to the first two prongs, the parties agreed
that the speech was entitled to First Amendment protection and that the government had a
substantial interest in preventing minors from using tobacco).
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government interest and whether these restrictions were narrowly
tailored. 149 After considering these questions, the Court found that the
regulations directly advanced the Government's interest satisfying the
third prong of the Central Hudson test.1 50 The Court in Lorillard
reasoned that the evidence provided, which cited studies that supported
the correlation between advertising and tobacco use, was enough to
satisfy the test's third prong.15 1 However, the Court then found that the
regulations were not a "reasonable fit between the means and ends of the
regulatory scheme., 152 Like in Central Hudson, even when the first,
second, and third prongs are satisfied, in Lorillardthe Court held that the
regulations failed to satisfy the fourth prong.1 53 The Court explained that
the regulations were in fact more
extensive than necessary to accomplish
154
the government's stated goals.

When deciding if commercial freedom of speech rights are being
violated, the Court continuously acknowledges the importance of
balancing one of our most cherished constitutional
rights-the First
155
informed.
be
to
right
public's
the
Amendment-with
IV. HAS THE FDA CREATED AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL RULE?

This section will analyze whether the FDA's Rule is an
unconstitutional infringement on the tobacco companies' First
Amendment rights.
In order to determine if The Rule violates
commercial free speech, this section will apply the four-part Central
149. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, (2001).
150. Id.
151. See id.("[I]n previous cases we have acknowledged the theory that product
advertising stimulates the demand for products, while suppressed advertising may have
the opposite effect.").
152. Id.("[T]he breadth and scope of the regulations, and the process by which the
Attorney General adopted the [Massachusetts] regulations, do not demonstrate a careful
calculation of the speech interest involved."). At the center of the Court's finding was
the fact that the 1000-foot restriction was inappropriate for every area. See id.at 562-63.
For that reason, the Court found that the effect of such regulation would vary depending
on the location and therefore should be tailored. See id. at 563. In addition, the Court
found that it was unclear why a ban on oral communication was necessary and that the
restrictions on the size of signs was overbroad. Id.The Court emphasized the rights of
the tobacco manufacturers in conveying information about their products to adults and
the mutual right of adults to receive such information. Id. at 564.
153. Id.
154. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 566 (2001) (citing Central
Hudson and concluding that a regulation must fail if it only offers "ineffective or remote
support" for the government's stated purpose).
155. Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 500 n.10 (1996) (Stevens, J.)
(quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 574
(1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) (agreeing that even "though
Icommercial' speech is involved, such a regulation strikes at the heart of the First
Amendment").
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Hudson test to The Rule. 156 In addition, this section will discuss whether
The Rule enacted by the FDA was within the FDA's regulatory
authority.
In order to determine whether The Rule meets Central Hudson's
first prong, a court must decide whether it implicates speech that is
entitled to First Amendment protection. 157 If the information is "neither
misleading nor related to unlawful activity," the Government's ability to
restrict the communication is limited due to the protection afforded to
speech under the First Amendment. 58 The Supreme Court has
continuously adopted a broad stance as to what speech is protected as
1 59
non-misleading under the First Amendment.
This broad stance was
60
Lorillard.1
in
holding
the
by
exemplified
In Lorillard, the Court promptly found the government satisfied
Central Hudson's first prong without providing any substantive
analysis.16 1 The Court made it clear that, like forms of commercial
speech that express a company's product in a positive light, compelled
speech that forces companies to distribute negative information is subject
to the same First Amendment protections afforded to all other
commercial speech. 162 Therefore, The Rule likely satisfies the first prong
by implicating speech that is entitled to First Amendment protection.
After a determination that the speech in question implicates the First
Amendment, the second prong of the Central Hudson test requires 163a
showing that the regulation furthers a substantial government interest.
As described in The Act, the purpose for granting the FDA the power to
regulate tobacco was to reduce youth tobacco use and "to effectively
convey the negative health consequences of smoking on cigarette
packages and in advertisements."' 64 In Lorillard,the Court found that
there was little merit in contesting whether the State possessed a
156. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
157. See id.
158. See id at 566 (finding that "[f]or commercial speech to come within that
provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading"); see also
Lorillard,533 U.S. at 554-55 (majority opinion).
159. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
160. Seeid at 554-55.
161. See id.
162. See id.
at 554.
163. See CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
164. See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Act ("The Act"), Pub. L. No. 11131, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333) (describing
congressional findings and the purposes of The Act); see also U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., PREVENTING TOBACCO USE AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE: A REPORT OF THE

SURGEON GENERAL 5, 135 (1994) (describing the effects of youth smoking on adult
smoking and noting that "well over 80 percent of adolescents who smoked half a pack a
day or more as seniors in high school ... were smoking five to six years later as young
adults").
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substantial interest in "preventing the use of tobacco products by
minors." 165 The Court believed that that State's interest was clear and
substantial. 166 Consequently, in the wake of Lorillard, it would seem
clear that the government's interest in preventing minors from beginning
to smoke would pass the substantial interest prong. The government's
other stated interest of educating the public about the health risks of
smoking is not as straightforward as its interest in discouraging smoking
in the youth population; yet, as presented, it would still make a strong
prima facie case that The Rule promotes a substantial government
interest.
However, closer inspection reveals that the governments primary
purpose is not, as it claims, to simply inform. 167 Instead, the government,
through its own words and data, concedes that its actual purpose is to
advocate for a change in consumer behavior, i.e., to quit smoking.168 For
that reason, what would seem like a clear cut case in the wake of
Lorillard may turn out to be a point of substantial debate. The
government acknowledges that the images chosen for the labels were not
the images that would best inform the viewer; instead, the images chosen
were those that had the highest shock value. 169 In addition, the FDA
Commission announced that the purpose of The Rule was to encourage
smokers to quit and to deter others from starting to smoke. 70 For those
reasons, although the government stated that the statutory purpose of The
Rule was to inform the public, a court may find that The Rule's actual
purpose was to launch an anti-smoking campaign using the tobacco
companies as the platform and financial backing. It has even been
alleged that The Rule's stated purpose may have been put forth simply as
a means of easily satisfying a challenge to the substantial government
interest prong. 17' The purposed motivation for The Rule, compelling
anti-smoking advocacy, has never been found to satisfy the substantial
interest prong. In fact, the Court has repeatedly struck down such
paternalistic attempts by the government. 172 In light of the strong direct
evidence indicating the FDA has an ulterior motive, a court would likely
hold that the government's interest in pushing an anti-smoking campaign
at the expense of tobacco companies' is not a compelling interest;

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
(1980).

Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 555.
See id.
at 36,638-639.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See Press Briefing, supra note 17.
See Pearson v. Shalala, 130 F. Supp. 2d 105, 113 (D.D.C. 2001).
See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563
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therefore,73 The Rule will not satisfy the second prong of Central
Hudson. 1
Although the above analysis discredits the government's stated
interest in The Rule, for the purposes of further examination, the
following analysis will show deference to the government and proceed as
if their stated interest was genuine. If a court were to determine that the
government's primary purpose behind The Rule is to inform the public, it
will still be difficult for The Rule to satisfy the third prong by showing
that the warning labels imposed by The Rule "directly and materially
advance" the government's interest. 74 Rather, as discussed below, it is
more likely that a court would find that the warning labels have little, if
any, impact on consumers understanding of the potential health related
consequences caused by smoking.
The FDA claims that the graphic warning images imposed by The
75
Rule will alleviate harm caused by cigarettes to a material degree.1
However, yet again the government's own data and statements contradict
its claim. The government acknowledged that the study conducted for
the purpose of selecting graphic images to be used for the warning labels
did not test whether the graphic images would have an impact on
consumer awareness of smoking-related risks. 76 Rather, the study
assessed "the relative impact of different warnings based on participants'
exposure to one graphic warning on one occasion.' ' 77 This admission is
a strong indication that the government was more concerned with the
cognitive responses the images produced. 78 The FDA further concedes
that the images selected were the ones that had the strongest tendency to
make viewers "depressed, discouraged, and afraid" and were not images
that were particularly informative to the viewer.' 79 As a result, it will be
difficult for the government to show that the graphic images required by
The Rule further, or correlate to, the statutorily stated interest of
informing the public.

173. See CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
174. See id. at 566 (holding that "[i]f both inquiries yield positive answers, we must
determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted");
see also Edenfiled v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-73 (1993) (requiring evidence that
commercial speech prohibitions "serve [the government's] purposes in a direct and
material manner" under the third prong of the Central Hudson test).
175. See 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,638-39.
176. See id.
177. Id.
178. See id.
179. See id (measuring "salience," which is defined as an image's tendency to make
viewers "depressed, discouraged, and afraid," and stating that the FDA chose warnings
that scored high on such a measure and that "arouse[d] fear," triggered "greater negative
emotional reactions," or "confer[red] negative feelings about smoking").
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In support of the FDA's claim, the FDA also cites the successful use
80
of similar graphic warning labels on cigarette packages in Canada.
The FDA relies on a Canadian study in support of the position that the
warning labels imposed by The Rule would directly reduce the smoking
rates in the United States by 0.212 percent. 18' However, the research
used to calculate this estimate relied on two flawed assumptions and
failed to account for possible confounding factors. 82 The FDA concedes
that "[i]mplicit in this method [was] the assumption that these otherwise
unexplained differences may be attributed solely to the presence in
Canada of graphic warning labels."' 83 The FDA further acknowledges
that, because of their inability to account for "confounding factors," it
renders the data from the study highly uncertain.' 84 Even without the
flaws, the FDA has conceded that the alleged estimated reduction
percentage of 0.212 percent was, in fact, "not statistically distinguishable
from zero."' 85 Despite the apparent statistical errors, the FDA still uses
the data as justification for the warning labels. 86 The major flaws in the
FDA's benefit analysis, combined with the questionable testing
preformed on the graphic images, leaves the government lacking any
empirical data supporting the claim that The Rule furthers its stated
interest. Therefore, The Rule will likely fail to satisfy CentralHudson's
third prong.' 87
Finally, Central Hudson's fourth prong requires a case-by-case
inquiry into whether there is "a reasonable fit between the means and
ends of the regulatory scheme" imposed by the new regulation. 88 The
Court has held that the fit need not be perfect; however, the scope of the
180. See id. at 69,453.
181. Id.
182. See Complaint, supra note 15, at *15 (citing two flawed assumptions made by
the FDA: (1) after Canada introduced similar cigarette warning labels in 2000, any
decrease in Canadian smoking rate trends beyond those that occurred in the United States
during the same period of time were caused by the new cigarette warning labels as
opposed to other factors; and (2) the cigarette warning labels would cause the same
change in U.S. smoking rates).
183. 75 Fed. Reg. at 69,453.
184. Id. at 69,456 ("[T]he U.S. social policy climate may have been so different from
Canada's during the years 1999-2008 that this proxy is inappropriate.").
185. See id.
186. Compare 75 Fed. Reg. 69,543, with 76 Fed. Reg. 36,721 (indicating that the
FDA's estimated reduction for smoking in the United States decreased from 0.212% in
the Proposed Rule to 0.088% in the Final Rule), and 76 Fed. Reg. 36,724 (explaining
further that the "FDA's estimate of a 0.088 percentage point reduction in the U.S.
smoking rate").
187. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
188. See id. at 566 (stating that you must determine whether the regulation is "not
more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest"); see also Lorillard Tobacco Co.
v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 561-66 (2001) (conducting a rigorous application of the fourth
prong of the CentralHudson test).
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regulation must be "in proportion to the interest served; that employs not
necessarily the least restrictive means but ... [is] narrowly tailored to
achieve the desired objective."' 189 In addition, The Rule must have been
imposed through careful calculations of "the cost and benefits associated
with the burden on speech imposed by the regulations."' 90 Applying this
standard to The Rule, it is obvious that it will be difficult for the
government to support the claim that The Rule is narrowly tailored and
was imposed through careful calculations to ensure that the least
burdensome means available was used.
To begin, the sheer size and placement requirements for the graphic
images suggest they are not narrowly tailored.' 9' Simply because The
Act promulgated the FDA to impose a rule consistent with the
regulations given in The Act does not mean The Rule will automatically
pass constitutional muster.'92 Commandeering 50 percent of the fronts
and backs of all cigarette packages is likely not a directive that will be
capable of being seen as narrowly tailored.1 93 The overtly large size
indicates not only that The Rule is not narrowly tailored but also that the
labels are not being used for the stated purpose of informing the public of
the hazards of smoking. In fact, the Secretary of Health and Human
Services indicated that the purpose of the large labels was "to rebrand...
our cigarette packs" to make every cigarette package in the country a
"mini-billboard.' 94 In the wake of Entertainment Software Association
v. Blagojevich,195 it will be difficult for the government to make a
credible argument that the size of these "mini-billboards" was narrowly
tailored.' 96 In Blagojevich, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held
that a four-square-inch sticker on a video game box failed to be narrowly
tailored because "it covered a substantial portion of the box."' 97 The
video game boxes were much larger than the cigarette packages,' 98 and

189. CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
190. Id.
191. See Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2) (providing the size and placement requirements
for the warning labels).
192. See id
193. Id.
194. See Press Briefing, supra note 17 (quoting HHS Secretary Sebelius that the
warnings effectively "rebrand... our cigarettes").
195. Entertainment Software Ass'n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2006).
196. See id. at 652.
197. See id. ("[C]ertainly we would not condone a health department's requirement
that half of the space on a restaurant menu be consumed by the raw shellfish warning.
Nor will we condone the State's justified requirement of the four square-inch '18'
sticker.").
198. See FDA, Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements ("The
Rule"), 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628 (June 22, 2011).

2012]

THE FDA's ArrEMPT TO SCARE THE SMOKE OUT OF YOU

245

the four-inch-square that failed the tailoring test covered far less than 50
percent of the package.
In addition to the size requirements under The Rule, the actual
graphic images are not narrowly tailored. The FDA claims that the
chosen images are "warnings," but it seems inaccurate to describe them
as such when the images were designed to elicit disgust, fear, and shock
from consumers. 99 While The Act requires color image warnings, the
chosen images do not necessarily fall under the category of "warning"
images at all; some are cartoons and others are photographs that have
been notably modified by computer programs. 20 0 The FDA has even
admitted that "some of the photographs were technologically modified to
depict the negative health consequences of smoking. 2 1
There are several ways that the FDA could have more narrowly
tailored the warning images. Alternatives might include a graph that
shows a correlation between the number of people who try to quit versus
those who actually do or a graph that indicates the increase in medical
complications that may occur for expecting mothers who smoke in
comparison to those who do not smoke. These are just a few examples
of alternative graphic-images for warning labels that would be better
tailored to educate the public about the risk of smoking.
Beyond the graphic images themselves, The Rule's requirement that
each warning prominently display "1-800-QUIT-NOW," the smoking
cessation hotline, furthers the argument that The Rule is not narrowly
tailored.20 2 The cessation provision supports the argument that The Rule
compels tobacco companies to advocate the government's anti-smoking
campaign.
When considering the totality of The Rule's label requirementsthe ineffectiveness of the content, the content itself, the size of the labels,
and the placement of the labels-the Rule is unlikely to satisfy Central
Hudson's fourth prong.20 3 A court would likely find that The Rule is
unconstitutional because the warning labels are more extensive than
necessary and because they are not the least restrictive means available
to accomplish the government's goal. Instead, the government should
use one of the numerous alternatives available to them. Such alternatives
would be no less, if not more, effective than the warnings in question
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200.
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while imposing
a lower burden on the First Amendment rights of tobacco
20 4
companies.
After analyzing The Rule under Central Hudson's four-part test, it
seems clear that The Rule is an unconstitutional infringement on the
tobacco companies' freedom of speech. 20 5 The Rule is a bold attempt by
the government to further its efforts in minimizing or eliminating tobacco
use in the United States, however, it is likely that courts will seek to
protect fundamental First Amendment rights and strike down The Rule.
If the government wishes to ban tobacco use in the United States, it may
do so. However, as long as cigarettes remain a legal product, the
government may not push its anti-smoking agenda by violating tobacco
companies' rights, packaging, and bank accounts to promote and fund an
agenda that directly harms the interest of those same companies.
Another strong argument for striking down The Rule in favor of
First Amendment protection manifests when one examines the logical
expansion of the government's reasoning for the compelled graphic
images. There are many products that are potentially harmful yet are
legal to sell and purchase within the United States. 0 6 If the FDA is
allowed to infringe upon the tobacco companies' free speech rights in the
name of public health, next the American public may see alcoholic
beverage containers that display color images of people with yellowed
skin suffering from jaundice or images of fatal car accidents. In theory,
such images would be accompanied by large text with such statements as
"Alcohol Can Kill" and "Quit-Now." 20 7 Moreover, with obesity related
deaths and health complications on the rise, informing young people
about avoiding obesity and encouraging adults to choose a healthy life
style could be the government's next substantial interest. 208 If the FDA
is allowed to compel graphic images to prevent and inform the public of
these dangers, Americans may next see images of diseased gallbladders,
livers, and hearts before biting into a Big Mac hamburger at
McDonald's. By comparison, if alcohol and unhealthy foods prove to be
beyond the FDA's regulatory authority, arguably, so should cigarettes.

204. See discussion infra section IV (discussing alternatives the government could use
to achieve their stated purpose without infringing on the tobacco companies First
Amendment rights).
205. See CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
206. See, e.g., Alcohol Related Disease Impact, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, http://1.usa.gov/IfMln5 (last visited Aug. 18, 2012).
207. See id.
208. Lauren Kaplin, A National Strategy to Combat the Childhood Obesity Epidemic,
15 U.C. DAVIS J. Juv. L. & POL'Y 347, 351 (2011) (discussing how obesity has become
"the most expensive preventable healthcare cost, with over a quarter of Americans and
seventeen percent of children and adolescents weighing in as obese").
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In sum, the FDA cannot promulgate a Rule that violates the
Constitution, even if such a rule complies with legislative requirements.
Therefore, regardless of the fact that The Act granted the FDA the power
to regulate cigarettes, The Rule created in response to The Act likely
violates the First Amendment. Simply put, it is likely that the labels at
issue go too far, calling for emotionally charged images instead of
factual, uncontroversial information to ensure that the public is well
informed. In attempting to ensure that tobacco marketing does not
deceive the public, the government has effectively crossed the line into
anti-smoking advocacy.
V.

ALTERNATIVES MEASURES

This Section will discuss possible alternatives the government could
employ that would enable them to inform the public about the potential
health related risks of smoking 20 9 without infringing on the tobacco
companies constitutional rights. Alternatives include school-based
smoking prevention programs, increased legal penalties for the sale of
tobacco products to minors, and criminalization of the possession of
tobacco products by minors. There are other possible alternatives the
government could use that would be less restrictive means of informing
the public as well, including similar current regulations the FDA finds
adequate to regulate food and drug products in the United States. Many
of these alternatives, further described below, have been statistically
proven to decrease smoking.
First, consistent with First Amendment principles, if the
government wants to decrease smoking in the United States, it should
employ a policy of "counter speech" instead of compelled speech. 2 10 If
the government is concerned about health risks related to smoking, it is
"free to propagandize against [it]" by engaging in speech counter to the
tobacco industry. 211 The counter speech alternative to the government's
current proposed policy would be more consistent with First Amendment
ideology and would encourage the free flow of information. 21 2 The use
of counter speech would balance out the distortions and biases that the
government believes have been created by the tobacco industry, giving
significant voice to the opposing party. Studies have shown that counter
speech against tobacco companies is a more effective method than
209.
210.
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See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J. concurring)

("If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to aver the
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Implications of 44 Liquormart, 1996 SuP. CT. REv. 123, 141 (1996).
212. See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377.
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compelled speech.2 13 As Kathleen Sullivan, a Stanford University law
professor, writes, "[T]he best answer to speech is not regulation but more
speech.,214 Sullivan supports the theory of counter speech with
statistical proof: a decrease in smoking directly correlated to the antismoking campaigns run by the American Cancer Society and other
groups in the 1960s. 21 5 Studies from this period indicate that the antismoking campaigns were so effective that they contributed to a reduction
in cigarette smoking.2 16
Creating more school-based smoking prevention programs is
another possible alternative that would specifically target and discourage
smoking among adolescents. Studies have shown that school-based
programs centered on the social-influence-resistance model ("The
Model") are most effective in long-term smoking prevention among
youths.21 7 The Model recognizes and emphasizes the social environment
in the decision-making process and helps build the skills necessary to
resist peer pressure. 218 School-based programs would directly influence
the youth population by providing them with information about the
potential harms of smoking. More importantly, instead of simply trying
to scare the youth from smoking, the Model helps youth build the
necessary skills needed to resist pressure among their peers to start
smoking. 219 Similar to the counter speech alternative, school-based
programs are statistically proven to be effective; moreover, the schoolbased programs would not infringe on tobacco companies' First
Amendment rights.
In addition to school-based prevention programs, there are
numerous other non-speech restrictive alternatives available to the
federal government that could effectively assist the government in
reaching their stated goal of preventing youth smoking. 220 Alternatives
include increasing the enforcement of state laws which prohibit the sale
of tobacco products to minors; criminalizing possession, not just use, of
tobacco products for minors; increasing anti-smoking education
campaigns; prohibiting smoking in all workplaces that employ workers

213. See Costello, supra note 60, at 687.
214. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Muzzle Joe Camel? It May Be Illegal, NEWSDAY, May
30, 1996, at A51.
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below the legal smoking age; further increasing the cost of tobacco
products; and imposing federal restrictions on possessing or selling
. All of these listed alternatives would be less
cigarettes to minors. 22
burdensome than the restriction on free speech imposed by The Rule. In
addition, the government is required to show that they are using the most
tailored means available to regulate. Therefore, by failing to first
implement such non-speech restrictive alternatives, The Rule will likely
be rendered unconstitutional because it is overly broad.222
The government could also employ similar regulations that have
been used on other legal products sold in the United States. For
example, the government requires information leaflets to be included
within contraceptive packaging. The government believes that these
information leaflets are an efficient way to provide the public with
information and warnings about the potential health consequences that
could occur from using contraceptives.223 Similarly, the government
could require information leaflets to be included within each cigarette
package. These informational leaflets would allow for a less obtrusive
way of providing the public with factual information regarding
cigarettes, the potential health effects of smoking, and information on
how to quit. Another example of a regulation previously employed by
the government is the use of uniform nutrition labels on food.224 The
Nutrition Labeling and Education Act was implemented to inform and
protect the public from misbranded food. The Nutrition Labeling and
Education Act required that nutrition information and ingredients be
listed on a label on the outside of the food package.2 25 The government
could require similar labels to be affixed to cigarette packages, which
would identify all the ingredients and chemicals in the cigarettes. While
both of these alternatives require information to be either included in the
cigarette packages or affixed on the outside of the package, these
alternatives would likely pass constitutional muster because the
221. See Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 536-38
(W.D. Ky. 2010).
222. See id.
223. See Dunkin v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 121 (1977) (W.D. Tenn.
1977). The case held that, as a matter of law, a leaflet contained in each birth control pill
dispenser was an adequate warning given by the drug manufacturer. Id. at 123. The
leaflet labeled "patient information" warned that safe use of birth control pills required a
careful discussion with a doctor and that the most serious known side effect of birth
control pills was abnormal blood clotting; the court found that, in terms of precision, "the
warning was adequate because it pointed out the risk. Id.
224. Nutrition Labeling & Education Act, 21 U.S.C. § 343 (2006).
1952), certioraridenied, 345
225. See United States v. Kocmond, 200 F.2d 370 (I11.
U.S. 924 (1953) (concluding that the purpose of the labeling requirement was to prohibit
commerce in misbranded articles and to inform and protect the ultimate consumer); see
also 21 U.S.C. § 343 (2006).
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information would be purely factual and uncontroversial.226 In sum,
these alternatives have been found to be effective in informing and
protecting the public from potential health risks without infringing on
First Amendment rights.
Because there are numerous alternatives the government could use
that would likely not infringe on tobacco companies' First Amendment
rights, it is likely that The Rule's warning labels are not the most tailored
alternative the government could use to achieve its stated purpose.
Therefore, a court would likely hold that The Rule is unconstitutional
due to a lack of tailoring. 227 Moreover, many of the available alternatives
have statistical data proving efficacy, 2 whereas The Rule is arguably
overbroad and utterly devoid of any empirical evidence indicating its
effectiveness. 229 The government should thus reconsider The Rule and
use an alternative method that would not infringe on the tobacco
companies' First Amendment rights.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The First Amendment protects not only consumers and public
information but also unpopular speech directed at influencing consumer
vices. 23 If the government wants to publicize its anti-smoking message,
as well as provide information on how to quit smoking, it may do so;
however, it must do so by constitutional means which employ narrowly
tailored methods that do not infringe on the tobacco companies' First
Amendment rights.
The government cannot require tobacco
manufacturers to make their legal products into mini billboards to
broadcast the government's anti-smoking campaign, and it cannot force
tobacco companies to bear the cost in doing so. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly used Central Hudson's four-part test to deny paternalistic
attempts at government interference that would thwart consumer choice.
The FDA rule requiring graphic visual images to be displayed on
cigarette packages is overly broad and poorly aligned with the
government's overall purpose. By ignoring less restrictive and more
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tailored means, the nine new cigarette-warning labels are likely an
unconstitutional affront to the commercial speech doctrine.
In the future, some adults will choose to avoid smoking altogether,
some will choose to quit smoking to protect their health, and others will
choose to smoke and accept the risk. Whatever their choices may be,
what matters is that it remains just that: a choice that is free from
government interference that threatens to diminish the constitutional
rights of all American citizens. If The Rule is not struck down as
unconstitutional, it will encourage a slippery slope where the government
can continue to exceed its legislative authority by imposing unjust
regulations on legal products as it sees fit, and one of our most cherished
constitutional rights will be further eroded and diminished.

